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STATUTES 
63-30-3, Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all 
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury 
which results from the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other govern-
mental health care facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training 
program conducted in either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters 
and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and 
storm systems by governmental entities are considered to be 
governmental functions, and governmental entities and their 
officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities. 1985 
63-30-8* Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, 
unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, bridges, or other 
structures. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived 
for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous 
condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, 
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other structure 
located thereon. 1965 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or 
defective public building, structure, or other public 
improvement - Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived 
for any injury caused from a dangerous or defective condition 
of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or other 
public improvement. Immunity is not waived for latent 
defective conditions. 1965 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
AGRUMENT POINT I - Plaintiff contends that the immunity 
granted by statute is expressly waived because of subsequent 
sections in the Governmental Immunity Adt. 
ARGUMENT POINT II - Plaintiff contends that the statute 
defendant relies upon for immunity was never intended to 
apply to plaintiffs injured after the manner in which the 
plaintiff in the case at bar was injured. Further, that the 
immunity was intended to promote flood control and to absolve 
governmental entities in times of a flooding emergency 
immunity from suit, 
ARGUMENT POINT III - Plaintiff discusses the various state 
district court cases which defendant relies upon to further 
its argument. Simply put, the cases cited deal with flooding 
and abnormal water run-off and nothing less. 
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ARGUMENT POINT I 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IS WAIVED FOR INJURY 
CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE, UNSAFE OR DANGEROUS 
CONDITION OF ANY HIGHWAY, STREET, ALLEY, 
CULVERT, TUNNEL OR OTHER STRUCTURE LOCATED 
THEREON AND ANY PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT, 
The mere classification and operation of a governmental 
entity as being a "Governmental Function" does not in and of 
itself grant to the governmental entity unconditional 
immunity under Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-3. 
In the case of Frank v. State, 613 P2d 517 (Utah 1980), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that where a claim was asserted 
against the University of Utah Medical Center and the State 
of Utah as its owners for negligent treatment of patient, 
that the fact that the operation of the hospital was 
considered a governmental function by virtue of the language 
contained in Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-3. 
The immunity was still modified by the additional 
language contained in the chapter. The court stated in 
relevant part: "The grant of immunity is thus expressly 
subjected to the operation of other sections of the Act." 
613 P.2d at 519. 
In the case at bar, subsequent sections of the act waive 
the immunity granted under U.C.A. § 63-30-3. In § 63-30-8, 
Utah Code Annotated, it states that: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused by 
a defective, unsafe or dangerous condition 
of any highway, railroad, street, alley, 
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cross walk, side walk, culvert, tunnel, 
bridge, viaduct or other structure located 
thereon. 
Therefore, the governmental immunity granted in § 63-30-3, 
Utah code Annotated, is expressly waived for injury caused by 
the above-stated defective, unsafe or dangerous conditions. 
In Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), the court 
held that a governmental entity had waived immunity under 
this section for a defective and dangerous highway project 
which included the storm drain system. Therefore, the storm 
drain and storm drain cover which the plaintiff alleges to 
have been negligently maintained, would be covered under this 
waiver of immunity. 
Furthermore, immunity is waived under Utah Code Anno-
tated § 63-30-9 for a dangerous or defective condition 
involving a "public improvement". The storm drain system and 
tne storm drain cover would qualify under this waiver of 
immunity as a public improvement as well. 
ARGUMENT POINT II 
THE STATUTE WHICH DEFENDANT RELIES UPON WAS 
INTENDED ONLY TO APPLY IN THE MANAGING OF 
FLOOD WATERS AND NOT THE NORMAL OPERATION 
OF A STORM DRAIN SYSTEM. 
The defendant correctly advised the court that the 
present amended section from which the defendant claims 
immunity was passed in the 1984 Budget Session, entitling the 
bill "Flood Relief". The court may recall the proolems with 
flooding that Utah faced in the spring of 1982, '83 and 1984. 
The problems associated there with collapsing streets, rising 
lake levels, endangered freeways and sliding canyons. 
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The state was facing a problem of astronomical propor-
tions. The legislature reacted. Controversial lake pumping 
began and protective legislation was passed to grant 
governmental immunity to political entities that had to act 
quickly to protect valuable property. Obviously some people 
would be injured in the process of the state's remedial 
actions. 
The present amendment to governmental immunity comes 
from a "Flood Relief" bill. It was intended as protection 
only in times of flood and things pertaining to flooding. 
Normal and ordinary storm drainage was not contemplated by 
the legislature. If it were, then succeeding sections 
63-30-8 and 9 should have been clarified as well. Since the 
legislature did not do so, the subsequent provisions snould 
control. 
In Matheson v. Crockett, 577 P.2d 948 (Utah 1978) this 
court stared: "We may look to the intention of the 
legislature when there exists an ambiguity in the language of 
the statute." 577 P.2d at 949. 
And in Grant v. Utah State Land Bd., 485 P.2d 1035 (Utah 
1971) this court stated: 
[T]hat where there is ambiguity or uncer-
tainty in a portion of a statute, it is 
proper to look to the entire act in order 
to discern its meaning and intent; and if 
it is reasonably susceptible of different 
interpretations, the one should be chosen 
which best harmonizes with its general 
purpose. 
485 P.2d at 1037. 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-3-8 provides a waiver of 
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immunity from suit for defective, unsafe or dangerous 
condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, 
siaewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other structure 
located thereon. This Code section would include storm 
drains within its meaning. 
U.C.A. (1953 as Amended) § 63-30-9 waives immunity for 
the dangerous or defective condition of any public improve-
ment. And quite obviously the storm drain would be a public 
improvement. Those two code sections directly conflict with 
the amendment of U.C.A. § 63-30-3. Therefore, this court can 
look to the entire act to determine the intent of the 
legislature. 
And as was wisely done in the district court, Judge Roth 
determined that the legislature did not intend to exclude the 
type of injury plaintiff suffered. 
ARGUMENT POINT III 
ALL BUT ONE OF THE CASES DEFENDANT CITES AS 
BEING DECIDED IN THE STATE OF UTAH WERE 
DEALING WITH FLOODING AND NOT ORDINARY 
STORM DRAINS. 
Looking at the various court cases decided on this issue 
in the state of Utah, as provided by defendant's counsel in 
Appendix IV of Appellante Brief, all but one deal with 
flooding. In Anderson v. The City of Nephi, Judge George E. 
Ballif stated: 
Nephi City contracted with Lynn's Con-
struction Company to repair and improve the 
city's flood channels following damage to 
their flood and storm system in 1983. The 
evidence before this Court supports the 
conclusion that the primary purpose of the 
work so contracced was to repair and 
construct Nephi's flood and storm system. 
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In White's Inc. v. Cache County, Judge Ronald 0. Hyde 
dealt with a case where Cache County had been negligent in 
building a culvert which could not accomodate drainage water 
in a period of heavy water run-off. In Warren Irrigation 
Company v. Weber County, Judge David E. Roth, in dismissing 
the claim stated: "Here, in an attempt to manage the 
widespread flooding in Weber County during May of 1983 and 
after declaring a local disaster emergency, defendant, by and 
through its authorized officers, breached plaintiff's canal." 
Here again looking at flooding. In Rydman v. Sandy City 
Corporation, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup was presented with a 
factual situation where during an abnormally high storm 
run-off sewers backed up and property was damaged. 
(Plaintiff's counsel contacted the attorney for Rydman to 
ascertain those facts.) In Larsen v. Brigham City, Judge 
Omer J. Call stated: "The Court also concludes that the 
water which found its way onto plaintiff's lands during 1984 
resulted from defendant's flood control measures necessitated 
by the abnormally heavy precipitation. . . . " In Branam v. 
Provo School District, Judge George E. Ballif dealt with a 
plaintiff whose home was flooded when the defendant school 
was pumping the flood waters out of the basement of the 
school during an emergency flooding, abnormally high run-off 
spring. (Plaintiff's attorney acquired these facts by 
contacting the attorney for Branam.) In Blackburn v. 
Bountiful City, Judge Douglas L. Cornaby stated: "The 
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plaintiffs were damaged in the spring of 1983 when raw sewage 
backed up into their houses. The damage occurred because of 
the spring floods. " In Mendenhall v. University Mall and 
Orem City, Judge George E. Ballif was presented with a case 
wherein water came off the mall into a catch basin, plaintiff 
contended that the drainage was diverted and therefore 
flooded plaintiff's property. An engineer testified that due 
to the unusually high run-off and flood the water would have 
damaged plaintiff anyway. (Plaintiff's attorney ascertained 
these facts by contacting the attorney for Mendenhall.) In 
Fairchild v. State of Utah, et.al., Judge J. Robert Bullock 
in dismissing the case was dealing with property owners who 
were injured during the flood problems. Their homes were 
downstream from some dams, one of which broke and the other 
which was cut to control the flooding. (Plaintiff's attorney 
ascertained these facts from contacting Fairchild's attor-
ney.) In Chesley v. Delta City, Judge Cullen Y. Christensen, 
in dismissing the case was dealing with backed up sewers as 
the result of Delta city plugging them up to stop them from 
overfilling city treatment plants. (Plaintiff's attorney 
ascertained these facts by contacting Chesley's attorney.) 
And in Brakensiek v. Dixie Six Corporation, Salt Lake County 
and Sandy City, Judge Scott Daniels dismissed a case dealing 
with flooding into homes from a catch basin maintained by the 
city during the abnormal rainfall. (Plaintiff's attorney 
ascertained these facts by contacting Brakensiekfs attorney.) 
Substantially, all of the cases dealt with flood control and 
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flooding associated with abnormal rainfall or run-off. 
The case at bar poses something entirely different. The 
plaintiff was injured because of a fall into a defectively 
designed and maintained storm drain. She was not injured by 
a storm drain that had anything to do with flood control. 
Nor was she injured because of the flooding. She was injured 
because of a negligently designed, constructed and maintained 
storm drain. This is simply not a case the legislature 
intended to immunize the government from. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff respectfully requests this court to allow 
the district court's ruling to stand. The statute at best is 
ambiguous and this court should construe it to give it its 
intended meaning by the legislature. It was a bill passed as 
an emergency measure for the protection of government. It 
should not be applied across the board to apply to the 
governmental units which carelessly, negligently and without 
due regard for the safety of the public, design, construct, 
or maintain a storm drain when such is not done for emergency 
sake or for the further protection and welfare of the greater 
portion of society. .JUT 
DATED this /^fc^day of February, 1988. 
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